INTRODUCTION
In setting forth tests and standards for constitutionality, the Supreme Court frequently creates its own artificial language that derives its meaning primarily through repeated application. Indeed, in United States v. Virginia, 2 Chief Justice William Rehnquist acknowledged the mutable nature of the Court's language when he remarked that even the most familiar tests and standards adopted by the Court "are hardly models of precision."
3 Given language's mutability, the words of these tests and standards should be used consistently in order to prevent them from being misinterpreted, as has happened to the language in United States v. Virginia.
In United States v. Virginia, the Court struck down the admissions policy of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a state school that admitted only men, because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 In considering the constitutionality of VMI's admissions policy, the Court applied
The judges and scholars who think that the United States v. Virginia Court heightened the standard of scrutiny applied to gender classifications are mistaken. Although the language used in the majority opinion in United States v. Virginia is different from that used in earlier gender-based equal protection opinions, the differences are relatively minor and do not represent a change from the Court's gender-based equal protection jurisprudence of the previous twenty years. 19 This Note demonstrates that, while the United States v. Virginia Court did not heighten the standard of scrutiny applied to gender classifications, the Court did use language that is needlessly confusing. 20 In order to examine both the language and the meaning of the Court's gender-based equal protection jurisprudence, this Note employs a model of communication developed by the linguist Roman Jakobson. Jakobson used this model to explain how the differing elements of communication-language (CODE), surrounding circumstances (CONTEXT), and meaning (MESSAGE)-are understood:
The ADDRESSER sends a MESSAGE to the ADDRESSEE. To be operative the message requires a CONTEXT referred to ("referent" in another, somewhat ambiguous, nomenclature), seizable by the addressee, and either verbal or capable of being verbalized; a CODE fully, or at least partially, common to the addresser and addressee (or in other words, to the encoder and decoder of the message); and finally, a CONTACT, a physical channel and psychological connection between the addresser and the addressee, enabling both of them to enter and stay in communication. 21 Thus, if language is mutable, then a CODE may change while the MESSAGE stays the same. 22 Of course, changing a CODE for no reason 23 while retaining the same MESSAGE will do little but confuse the ADDRESSEE. Stat. 3 (1998) . It is the same airport, but Congress dictated a new CODE to represent that MESSAGE. 23. There are obviously good reasons to change some CODES, such as to avoid using Part I of this Note explores the state of gender-based equal protection law before United States v. Virginia and shows that, for the most part, both the MESSAGE and the CODE of intermediate scrutiny for gender-based equal protection issues remained constant for the twenty-five years preceding the opinion. Part II analyzes the CODE, CONTEXT, and MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia and considers both the correct and incorrect interpretations of the MESSAGE. This Note concludes by reviewing the implications of unnecessarily changing the CODE used to convey a MESSAGE.
I. GENDER-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION BEFORE UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA
The Supreme Court did not recognize the application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to governmental distinctions between men and women until the latter part of the twentieth century. In 1971, the Supreme Court first struck down a gender classification for denying equal protection of the laws to women. 24 Since then, the MESSAGE of the Court's gender-based equal protection cases has been consistent: 25 gender classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny. The CODE used to convey this MESSAGE has also been consistent. Since 1976, the CODE "substantial relation to an important objective" has been used to convey the MESSAGE of intermediate scrutiny, 26 and, since 1981, the CODE "exceedingly persuasive justification" has been used interchangeably with the more familiar CODE "substantial relation to an important objective." 27 This consistency of MESSAGE and CODE reveals the settled nature of the Court's gender-based equal protection jurisprudence at the time United States v. Virginia was decided. 190, 197 (1976) (initiating the use of the CODE "substantial relation to an important objective") .
27. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (equating the CODE "exceedingly persuasive justification" with the CODE "substantial relation to an important objective").
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A. Gender-Based Equal Protection Before the Articulation of Intermediate Scrutiny
Congress clearly intended to address discrimination between people of different races through the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, 28 which declares that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 29 There is, however, no evidence that Congress intended to address discrimination between people of different genders through the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, it is not surprising that more than 100 years passed after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court recognized that gender classifications discriminating between men and women could deny equal protection of the laws to women. 30 When challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, most government action need only survive rational basis scrutiny, which merely requires that a statute be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. 31 Indeed, rational basis scrutiny was applied in equal protection cases involving gender classifications until late in the twentieth century. An example of such an application is Goesaert v. Cleary, 32 decided in 1948. In Goesaert, the Court found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in a Michigan statute that prohibited all women from tending bar except the daughters and wives of male bar owners. 33 Considering the CONTEXT of Goesaert-men returning to their jobs from the battlefields of World War II and forcing women from their war jobs back into the kitchen-it is not surprising that the Court held that discriminating between men and women was not problematic, but that discriminating between women was. without rhyme or reason. The Constitution in enjoining the equal protection of the laws upon States precludes irrational discrimination as between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law."
34
The Court thus interpreted gender discrimination to cover discrimination within a single gender instead of between the two genders. The Supreme Court eventually confronted the issue of discrimination between men and women in Reed v. Reed. 35 In Reed, the appellant challenged an Idaho law that provided that, in choosing between people equally entitled to administer the estate of one who dies intestate, men must be preferred over women. 36 The Supreme Court unanimously stated that the "mandatory preference" of the Idaho law violated the Equal Protection Clause under rational basis scrutiny:
A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by the operation of [ This language-the CODE-is roughly the same as that used in Goesaert, 38 but the analysis actually applied in Reed-the MESSAGEis very different from that applied in Goesaert.
39
Writing for the Reed Court, Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that the law was justifiable: he found that it was rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of "reducing the workload on probate courts by eliminating one class of contests." 40 The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause violation arose only in "the arbitrary preference [the statute] established in favor of males." 41 Despite the overwhelming similarity of Goesaert's CODE to Reed's, the fact that the same kind of preference had been declared permissible under rational basis scrutiny in Goesaert 42 suggests that the MESSAGE of Reed is that gender classifications would be subjected to something stricter than rational basis scrutiny.
Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson, 43 a plurality of the Court recognized the MESSAGE of Reed-that gender classifications would be subject to a level of scrutiny that is stricter than mere rational basis. 44 In Frontiero, the appellant challenged the Air Force's differing definitions of "dependent" for male and female spouses of officers. 45 While eight Justices voted to overturn the district court's ruling, 46 there was no majority opinion in Frontiero. Although the Court's lack of a majority opinion in Frontiero makes analysis of its 38. See Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 466 ("The Constitution . . . precludes irrational discrimination as between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law."); see also supra text accompanying notes 32-34 (discussing the facts and CONTEXT of Goesaert).
39 At the outset, appellants contend that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny. We agree and, indeed, find at least implicit support for such an approach in our unanimous decision only last Term in Reed v. Reed.
48
These four could not, however, persuade the other Justices to accept this application of strict scrutiny to gender classifications. In fact, two Justices failed even to discuss the giant step up to strict scrutiny advocated by Justice Brennan's plurality opinion. Justice Stewart stated his reasons for concurring in the judgment, though not the opinion, of the plurality in a terse, one sentence statement: "Mr. Justice STEWART concurs in the judgment, agreeing that the statutes before us work an invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution."
49 Justice Stewart's silence on the matter of the plurality's elevation of gender to a suspect classification indicates his disapproval of the idea. Justice Rehnquist wrote an equally terse dissent in which he disclosed his agreement with the district court (and disagreement with the majority) while refraining from expressly criticizing the plurality's action. 50 The three separately concurring Justices, however, gave voice to their dissatisfaction with the plurality opinion. upon race, alienage, and national origin,' are 'inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.' It is unnecessary for the Court in this case to characterize sex as a suspect classification, with all of the far-reaching implications of such a holding. . . . In my view, we can and should decide this case on the authority of Reed and reserve for the future any expansion of its rationale.
51
This concurrence thus advocated judicial restraint: the concurring Justices would have decided the case on the basis of Reed rather than through an application of strict scrutiny.
While Justice Powell's concurrence argued for deciding Frontiero on the basis of the Court's decision in Reed, it did not foreclose the possibility that strict scrutiny would be applied to gender classifications at some point in the future. The CONTEXT of this possibility must be understood, though. By the time Frontiero was decided, Congress had passed the Equal Rights Amendment, which would have made gender a suspect classification, and had sent it to the states for ratification. 52 Justice Powell expressed the opinion that declaring gender a suspect classification was properly a political process and that the Constitution actually required no more than the application of Reed rational basis scrutiny. 53 Thus, the MESSAGE of Frontiero seems to be that the appropriate level of scrutiny for gender classifications lies somewhere between rational basis scrutiny and strict scrutiny. 51 . Id. at 691-92 (citation omitted). Indeed, Reed provided the Court with precedent for overturning the district court's decision due to the fact that the differing definitions of "dependent" drew an unnecessary and arbitrary distinction between men and women and, thus, violated the Equal Protection Clause. 55 in Craig challenged an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of low alcohol content beer to women below the age of eighteen and to men below the age of twenty-one. 56 Based on the appellee's statistical evidence of young men's drunk-driving arrests and vehicular injuries, the district court concluded that the statute was substantially related to the achievement of greater safety on the highways of Oklahoma. 57 Although the district court correctly asserted that Reed's "fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation" 58 test was controlling, it ignored the MESSAGE behind that CODE, as well as the MESSAGE in Frontiero, and upheld the statute.
59
The Supreme Court refused to find the challenged law to be substantially related to Oklahoma's highway safety. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan matter-of-factly recited Reed's CODE with one significant addition-the word "important": "To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 60 These words became the CODE used to convey the MESSAGE of an intermediate level of scrutiny, somewhere between rational basis scrutiny and strict scrutiny-a MESSAGE the Court had been sending since Reed.
61
While the Court had applied an intermediate level of scrutiny since Reed, it had theretofore officially acknowledged only two levels of scrutiny: rational basis scrutiny, to which the bulk of all legislation was subjected, and strict scrutiny, to which only racial and religious 54. 429 U.S. 190 (1976 "[A]rchaic and overbroad" generalizations concerning the financial position of servicewomen and working women could not justify use of a gender line in determining eligibility for certain governmental entitlements. Similarly, increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the home rather than in the "marketplace and world of ideas" were rejected as loose-fitting characterizations incapable of supporting state statutory schemes that were premised upon their accuracy. In light of the weak congruence between gender and the characteristic or trait that gender purported to represent, it was necessary that the legislatures choose either to realign their substantive laws in a gender-neutral fashion, or to adopt procedures for identifying those instances where the sex-centered generalization actually comported with fact. Other Justices did not agree with the application of this intermediate level of scrutiny. Though silent on the majority's articulation of the intermediate scrutiny standard, Chief Justice Burger lodged his objection by simply stating in his dissent that he could find no "independent constitutional basis supporting the right asserted [by the appellants] or disfavoring the classification adopted" by Oklahoma.
67 Justices Powell and Stevens, on the other hand, directly addressed the Court's recognition of a new level of scrutiny. Although he joined the opinion of the Court, Justice Powell asserted that the Court's "decision today will be viewed by some as a 'middletier' approach" and refused to "endorse that characterization."
68 He did, however, admit that "candor compels the recognition" that gender classifications were being subjected to a higher standard of review than the rational basis scrutiny that was normally applied. 69 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens expressed his disagreement with the majority's new CODE-or with any CODE that recognized different levels of scrutiny-more strongly, declaring:
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases. Whatever criticism may be leveled at a judicial opinion implying that there are at least three such standards applies with the same force to a double standard.
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the twotiered analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion.
70
Although Justice Stevens objected to the CODE that the majority used to explain the Court's gender-based equal protection jurisprudence, he weakened the force of his objection by not proposing an alternate CODE whether Alabama's actions passed that scrutiny only in terms of Alabama's "exceedingly persuasive justification" (or the lack thereof). 95 Thus, while previous opinions had always explained the failure of gender classifications to pass intermediate scrutiny in terms of the CODE "substantial relation to an important governmental objective," the majority opinion in J.E.B. was the first to use only the CODE "exceedingly persuasive justification" to explain this failure.
Although the J.E.B. Court may have shifted its emphasis from the CODE "substantial relation to an important governmental objective" to the CODE "exceedingly persuasive justification," the J.E.B. Court did not change the MESSAGE of intermediate scrutiny.
In considering Alabama's arguments, the Court stated: "We shall not accept as a defense to gender-based peremptory challenges 'the very stereotype the law condemns.'" 96 The similarity of this statement to the Craig Court's earlier rejection of "'archaic and overbroad' generalizations concerning the financial position of servicewomen and working women" and "outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females" 97 suggests that the MESSAGE of intermediate scrutiny had remained consistent, though no firm conclusion can be drawn given the relative lack of explanation of the Court's equal protection analysis in this case. 95. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 (holding that Alabama's arguments that women on juries might be more sympathetic to female complainants fell "[f]ar from proffering an exceptionally persuasive justification for its gender-based peremptory challenges"). Presumably by mistake, the Court used the word "exceptionally" instead of "exceedingly." It is unclear why the Court made this and other simple linguistic mistakes. See also supra note 94 (discussing the Court's use of the word "legitimate" instead of the word "important"). 98. It was, perhaps, because the majority opinion lacked a clear definition of "exceedingly persuasive justification" that Justice Scalia, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, did not object to that phrase as the correct expression of "the 'heightened scrutiny' mode of equal protection analysis used for sex-based discrimination." J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 160-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He focused, instead, on the differences between peremptory strikes based on race, which he viewed as impermissible, and peremptory strikes based on gender, which he considered permissible. See id. at 159-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting (September 10, 1866)) ). This adversative method understandably inspired both love and loathing: life at VMI "is a life characterized by former cadets as one they would not take a million dollars for having lived, and wouldn't take a million dollars to go through again." Id. at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted) ( she collaborated with the ACLU lawyers on the appellant's brief.
121
After the unanimous decision in Reed, the ACLU formed its Women's Rights Project and named Ginsburg its first director.
122
As director, Ginsburg wrote and filed amici briefs for several of the landmark gender-based equal protection cases. In Frontiero, for example, it was the Ginsburg-authored amicus brief, not the appellant's brief, that pressed the strict scrutiny arguments ultimately adopted by Justice Brennan's plurality. 123 Ginsburg also wrote an amicus brief in Craig, 124 and she corresponded extensively with the Craig appellants' local attorney. 125 In fact, it was Ginsburg who actually made the suggestion that, given the Court's rejection of strict scrutiny in Frontiero only three years earlier, the Craig appellants should abandon their arguments for strict scrutiny and focus, instead, on a form of nonstrict, but still heightened scrutiny.
126
In focusing on the CONTEXT of Justice Ginsburg's work as an advocate, those who have misinterpreted the majority opinion's MESSAGE have ignored the CONTEXT of her work as a judge, which does not suggest that Justice Ginsburg desires to heighten the standard of scrutiny applied to gender classifications. As a judge on the D.C. Circuit, Judge Ginsburg did not behave like an activist. 131 that the "Court's equal protection decisions 'reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications' rather than three discrete 'tiers' of scrutiny." 132 Other than this reference, though, Judge Ginsburg's opinions do not suggest that she disagreed with the Court's genderbased equal protection jurisprudence. CONTEXT, however, is unwarranted. Justice Ginsburg's work as an advocate suggests that she may still have a desire to further heighten the standard of scrutiny applied to gender classifications. Justice Ginsburg's work as a judge, however, suggests that she has abandoned any former desire to heighten the standard of scrutiny applied to gender classifications. Taking into account both Justice Ginsburg's work as an advocate and her work as a judge, the CONTEXT of her authoring the majority opinion is inconclusive and does not shed any significant light on the true MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia.
B. The CODE of the Majority Opinion
Before reviewing the state of its gender-based equal protection analysis, the United States v. Virginia Court referred to the inquiry it was about to undertake as "skeptical scrutiny."
137 This CODE had never been used before and was part of the reason for the subsequent confusion as to the MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia. 138 Because the Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to require different levels of constitutional "scrutiny" to be applied to different kinds of government action-rational basis scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny-the Court's use of the CODE "skeptical scrutiny" has been interpreted as creating a new level of constitutional scrutiny.
139
Although the CODE "skeptical scrutiny" had not appeared in a Supreme Court opinion previously, the manner in which that CODE was used in United States v. Virginia suggests that it was meant merely to describe intermediate scrutiny. First, the CODE was used only one time, not repeatedly. Second, the CODE was used to refer to the inquiry actually undertaken by the Court in United States v. Virginia, 140 an inquiry that, while "skeptical," was nothing more than intermediate scrutiny. For the twenty years that preceded this case, the Supreme Court had been skeptical of gender classifications. 141 Indeed, the Court had fully acknowledged that skepticism fifteen 137. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 138. See, e.g., Kupetz, supra note 17, at 1334 (discussing the "new" equal protection standard of "skeptical scrutiny" for gender classifications articulated by Justice Ginsburg in the majority opinion).
139. See id. 140. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 ("Today's skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history.").
141. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
years before United States v. Virginia by expressly shifting to the state the burden of proving the validity of a gender classification. 142 The CODE "skeptical scrutiny" should not be interpreted as anything but a new way of describing intermediate scrutiny.
After referring to "skeptical scrutiny," the Court defined the level of scrutiny appropriate for gender-based equal protection using familiar CODES, albeit with a different emphasis. The Court noted "the core instructions of this Court's pathmarking decisions in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. and Mississippi University for Women: Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action."
143 At only two points does the majority opinion contain the CODE "substantial relation to an important governmental objective."
144 For the remainder of the opinion, VMI's admissions policy is considered in terms of the CODE "exceedingly persuasive justification."
145 For example, the Court found that "[t]he State's justification for excluding all women from 'citizen-soldier' training for which some are qualified, in any event, cannot rank as 'exceedingly persuasive,' as we have explained and applied that standard." 146 The Court went on to hold that "Virginia, in sum, 'has fallen far short of establishing the exceedingly persuasive justification' that must be the solid base for any gender-defined classification." 147 Several scholars, and even some judges, have interpreted the Court's emphasis on the CODE "exceedingly persuasive justification" to indicate a heightening of the level of scrutiny applied to gender classifications. 148 This interpretation, however, ignores the Court's own definition of the CODE "exceedingly persuasive justification." The Court explained the requirements of demonstrating such a justification:
Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must determine whether the proffered justification is "exceedingly persuasive." The burden 159. See, e.g., Corcoran, supra note 17, at 1010 (noting that the majority's use of the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification" indicates "that the Court might have applied a heightened form of intermediate scrutiny or, perhaps, even strict scrutiny").
160. See, e.g., Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 17, at 870; Corcoran, supra note 17, at 1010; Kupetz, supra note 17, at 1334; Udell, supra note 17, at 553. Whether or not such a standard is consistent with the Court's gender-based equal protection jurisprudence, it would probably not prove articulable. Although changing the CODE used to express the MESSAGE of intermediate scrutiny is all too easily done, creating a new standard of scrutiny between intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny would be difficult. To meet this hypothetical standard, a gender classification would have to serve governmental interests that were more than important but less than compelling, and the classification would have to be more than substantially related to those governmental interests but less than narrowly tailored to them. Distinguishing between the MESSAGES of the three tiers of the Court's current equal protection jurisprudence is difficult enough, but adding the MESSAGE of a fourth might blur the lines between each tier to the point that application was impossible.
161 The Court's rejection of Virginia's second argument in support of VMI's admissions policy is also consistent with the application of intermediate scrutiny. Virginia argued that VMI provided excellent leadership training for students through the school's unique adversative method and that the participation of women would mean the end of the adversative method. 179 The Court rejected Virginia's argument and found that the adversative method could survive the participation of women, 180 with increased privacy for cadets being the only significant change in the VMI experience. 181 Here, as in earlier gender-based discrimination cases, 182 186 and his concern that the majority would be misinterpreted as applying a stricter standard:
That phrase ["exceedingly persuasive justification"] is best confined, as it was first used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself. To avoid introducing potential confusion, I would have adhered more closely to our traditional, "firmly established," standard that a gender-based classification "must bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives."
187
This language serves no other function than to avoid any implication that the United States v. Virginia Court was predisposed to heightening the level of scrutiny applied to gender classifications.
Justice Scalia would also be unlikely to vote for the application of strict scrutiny, given the subject of his dissent in United States v. Virginia. 188 In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted that "[i]t is well settled" that gender classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny, but that he believes that intermediate scrutiny ought to be much less 185 . See supra Part II.B (discussing the Court's use of the CODE "skeptical scrutiny" in United States v. Virginia). While the confusion over the MESSAGE of United States v. Virginia would have existed whether Justice Ginsburg intended it or not, one must remember that it is pure conjecture that Justice Ginsburg would want to change the current state of the law. Her ACLU work in the 1970s revealed a patient, long-term strategy for effecting change, but it seems far-fetched that she would suppress her radical leanings for the twelve years that she sat on the D.C. Circuit, hoping that she would someday be appointed to the Supreme Court where she could once again indulge her desire to see gender classifications subjected to strict scrutiny. Nonetheless, the Court should have realized the confusion that would be created by the CONTEXT of her authoring the opinion, the emphasis on the CODE "exceedingly persuasive justification," and the introduction of the CODE "skeptical scrutiny. The CODE and CONTEXT of the majority opinion, however, have confused many of the scholars and some of the judges who have tried to ascertain the Court's MESSAGE. Given this reaction, the Supreme Court should be aware of how confusing a change in CODE can be and should avoid making such changes lest confusion result. Because even the most familiar tests and standards set out by the Supreme Court "are hardly models of precision" 199 and depend on maintaining as much consistency of CODE as possible to convey the same MESSAGE, great care must be taken by the Court to ensure that such confusion does not lead the lower courts to make a move that the Court itself was unwilling to make.
